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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC No. 05733-84/2
18 October 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: [Redacted]
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Europe

SUBJECT: Approval to Distribute Draft NIE 28.2-84 Nordic
Security: A Changing Outlook to NFIB Representatives

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1. Attached for your review is the subject draft which was prepared by [Redacted] of the NIC Analytic Group and this office. We have considered the 12 October 1984 comments of the Senior Review Panel and will make substantive adjustments in the text to address many of their specific concerns.

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4. In addition, we will propose to NFIB representatives that we make the following changes in the text during coordination:

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6. We hope to disseminate and coordinate this draft by late October.

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Attachments:

1. SRP Comments
2. Draft NIE

APPROVE:

/s/ William J. Casey

Director of Central Intelligence

22 OCT 1984

Date

DISAPPROVE:

Director of Central Intelligence

Date

Distribution:

- 1 - DCI
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Senior Review Panel

NIC-05847-84
12 October 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
NIO for Europe

SUBJECT: Senior Review Panel Comments on Draft
NIE 28.2-84: Nordic Security: A
Changing Outlook, received 9 October 1984

1. The Panel believes that the draft, despite its undoubted merits, does not succeed in projecting clear or particularly useful estimative conclusions. This is a matter both of the principal message of the Estimate and of its main assumption.

2. Principal Message. As we read it, the paper's basic thrust can be stated:

- There is a detectable increase on the part of Norway, Sweden, and Finland to improve their military forces in order to present a more credible deterrent to, or defense against, Soviet attack. Denmark and Iceland are unlikely to do so.
- Such improvements will be effected slowly and with caution so as not to irritate the Soviets unduly or to precipitate counter moves.
- Despite those military improvements, the Nordic states will probably be even less capable by the mid-1990s than at present, either singly or in concert, of preventing the Soviets from taking control of northern Norway or other parts of the Nordic area, should they so wish.

If this is the intended thrust of the paper, we think it deserves much more explicit statement than can now be found.

3. If our reading of the principal message is an incorrect interpretation on our part--and some other conclusion is intended such as, for example, new changes or deterioration in the

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vitality or durability of "Nordic Balance" as a deterrent to Soviet encroachment over the next 3-5 years--then some thorough editing of the draft seems indicated.

4. Whatever is intended, the "significant policy challenges," mentioned on pages 8 and 9 of the Key Judgments and pages 42-43 of the text, do not appear to us to merit the subtitle "A Changing Outlook." The "challenges" as itemized in the paper--adequacy of Nordic contributions, new weapons technologies vs. non-provocative Nordic attitudes, anti-nuclear sentiments, and Soviet sensitivities about Kola--are more persistent than new and are ones with which NATO and Western planners have grappled for the last 40 years.

5. Main Assumption. This appears to concern the importance the draft attaches to Norway. The first sentence at page 23, paragraph 19, states the matter:

"Holding northern Norway is essential to achieving NATO's maritime goal of denying Soviet naval forces control of the Norwegian Sea and North Atlantic Ocean in order to protect the Alliance's ability to reinforce and resupply Europe by sea."

If this statement is valid, it makes northern Norway the linchpin of any conventional NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict. It means that NATO's commitment to the defense of northern Norway should be near the top of its military priorities. Does the Community agree that NATO and US military planners accord this degree of importance to the area?

6. Peripheral Matters. In any reworking of the paper, we believe the Key Judgments need some expansion to reflect adequately the text's substance. We think the section labeled "The Economic Picture" on pages 20-21 is overly thin and sketchy and neglects projections into the 3-5 years' future of the paper. We would favor some summary data, or graphics on Nordic forces, equipment, dispositions, and defense trends, together with an indication of Soviet deployments in the area. Finally, we believe a strong case can be made for greater conciseness in the draft.

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cc: VC/NIC